信息不对称和风险资本退出  

Information Asymmetry and Exits of Venture Capital

作　　者：戴国强[1] 王国松[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海财经大学金融学院,上海200433

出　　处：《财经研究》2002年第2期30-35,共6页Journal of Finance and Economics

摘　　要：本文探讨了信息不对称与风险资本退出之间的关系。分析表明 :( 1 )高新技术企业在其启动阶段需要股权资本融资和独立的风险投资商 ;( 2 )对于投资于高新技术企业的风险资本而言 ,高效的风险资本退出方式是IPO退出方式 ,其次是收购退出方式 ;( 3)IPO退出方式需要活跃的股票市场 ;( 4 )美国高新技术业快速发展的关键所在是其拥有独立的风险投资商与活跃的股票市场。This paper studies the relationship between information asymmetry and exits of venture capital. It turns out that:(1)the high-tech firm needs equity financing other than debt financing at it's start-up stage;(2)for the venture capital invested in the high-tech firm, the most efficient exit pattern is the IPO exit, the acquisition one is secondary; (3)the IPO exit needs active stock market; (4)the key for rapid growth of the high-tech industry in the United States is that there are independent venture capitalists and active stock market.

关 键 词：信息不对称 高新技术企业 风险资本 退出方式 IPO 股票市场 

分 类 号：F276.44[经济管理—企业管理] F830.59[经济管理—国民经济]