股权集中度、管理者薪酬组合与自主创新投资  

Ownership concentration,managerial compensation package and independent innovation investment

作　　者：刘振[1] 刘博 Liu Zhen;Liu Bo(School of Accounting,Zhengzhou University of Aeronautics,Zhengzhou 450046,Henan,China;School of Business,Newcastle University,Newcastle NE17RU,UK)

机构地区：[1]郑州航空工业管理学院会计学院,河南郑州450046 [2]纽卡斯尔大学商学院

出　　处：《科研管理》2018年第12期95-102,共8页Science Research Management

基　　金：国家社科基金项目:"高管薪酬契约设计;研发配置优化与公司价值创造"(13BGL051;起止时间:2013.06-2017.06);河南省软科学重点项目:"郑州航空港财政科技投入优化路径研究"(162400410011;起止时间:2016.01-2018.12);教育部人文社科项目:"影响中国高新技术企业R&D投资水平的公司治理要素;机制和路径研究"(11YJA630070;起止时间:2011.11-2014.12);河南省普通高等学校人文社会科学重点研究基地资助项目和2014年度河南省高校科技创新人才(人文社科类)支持项目

摘　　要：基于代理理论和创新理论,探讨股权集中度对高新技术企业自主创新投资的影响。本文以中国A股上市高新技术企业为样本,运用联立方程组模型和三阶段最小二乘法,实证分析了不同控制权性质企业,股权集中度、管理者薪酬组合与企业自主创新投资之间的关系。研究结果显示:(1)在国有控股高新技术企业,股权集中度越高,管理者货币薪酬越高,股权薪酬越低,较低的股权薪酬诱导管理者提高货币薪酬;在非国有控股高新技术企业,股权集中度越高,管理者货币薪酬越低,股权薪酬越高,较高的股权薪酬强化了管理者提高货币薪酬的权力。(2)在国有控股高新技术企业,增加货币薪酬会诱导管理者降低企业自主创新投资,而在非国有控股高新技术企业,增加货币薪酬会激励管理者提高企业自主创新投资;在国有控股或非国有控股高新技术企业,管理者股权薪酬对企业自主创新投资均具有"N型"影响关系。Based on the agency theory and innovation theory,we analyze the effect of ownership concentration on independent innovation investment in high -tech enterprises.Taking A -share listed high -teeh enterprises in China as a sample,using simultaneous -equation models and three -stage least -squares method,this paper empirically analyses the relationships among ownership concentration,managerial compensation package and independent innovation investment in enterprises of different control rights.The research results indicate that:(1)in state-owned high-tech enterprises,the higher the ownership concentration,the higher the managerial monetary compensation and the lower the equity compensation,and lower equity compensation further induces manager to raise monetary compensation;on the other hand,in non -state -owned high -teeh enterprises,the higher the ownership concentration,the lower the managerial monetary compensation and the higher the equity compensation,and higher equity compensation further strengthens the managerial power to raise monetary compensation.(2)In state -owned high-tech enterprises,increasing monetary compensation will induce managers to reduce the independent innovation investment,but in non -state -owned high -tech enterprise,increasing monetary compensation will encourage managers to increase the independent innovation investment;in both the state -owned and non -state - owned high -tech enterprises,the managers'equity compensation has an "N-Type"impact on independent innovation investment.

关 键 词：股权集中度 货币薪酬 股权薪酬 自主创新投资 高新技术企业 

分 类 号：F273.1[经济管理—企业管理]