政治联系、财政补贴与企业绩效  

Political Connection,Fiscal Subsidy and Firm Performance

作　　者：曲红宝 QU Hong-bao(School of Economics and Statistics,Guangzhou University,Guangzhou 510006,China)

机构地区：[1]广州大学经济与统计学院,广东广州510006

出　　处：《现代财经（天津财经大学学报）》2018年第12期60-71,共12页Modern Finance and Economics：Journal of Tianjin University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目(16AJY021);广州大学人才引进项目(27000503139)

摘　　要：政治联系作为一种非正式制度安排对民营企业发展有重要影响。本文在反腐新政背景下考察政治联系对民营企业获得财政补贴和企业绩效的影响,研究发现:整体上,政治联系对民营企业获得财政补贴有显著正向作用,并且对直接民营化企业获得财政补贴的效应更大;比较来看,曾经任职型政治联系的正向作用显著,当期在职型政治联系的作用不显著。更进一步,发现反腐新政后没有政治联系和有当期在职型政治联系的企业,财政补贴与企业绩效显著正相关;有曾经任职型政治联系的企业,财政补贴与企业绩效不相关,甚至为负作用。这表明曾经任职型政治联系支持了寻租观点,同时反腐败抑制了当期在职型政治联系的寻租目的,未来政府应关注公共部门人力资本向私人部门流动带来的影响。As an informal institutional arrangement,political connection has important influence on development of private enterprises.Under the background of new anti-corruption policy,this paper investigates the impact of political connection on private enterprise’s fiscal subsidy and the effect of fiscal subsidy on firm performance.Empirical research shows that political connection has significant positive effect to get subsidies for private enterprise,and the effect is more for direct privatization enterprise.The effect of former political connection is significantly positive,and the effect of current political connection is not significant.Further research find that under new anticorruption policy,if a firm doesn’t have political connection and has current political connection,the relationship between fiscal subsidy and firm’s performance is significantly positive.For former political connection,the relationship is not significant,even negative.The results support the rentseeking viewpoint for former political connection and suggest that anti-corruption policy inhibit rentseeking effect of current political connection.So,government should pay more attention to officers’ transfer from public department to private department.

关 键 词：政治联系 寻租 财政补贴 

分 类 号：F270.3[经济管理—企业管理]