基于低碳偏好下的制造商信息收集与质量披露策略  

Manufacturer Information Collection and Quality Disclosure Strategy Based on Low Carbon Preference

作　　者：楼高翔[1] 刘书源 万宁[2] Lou Gaoxiang;Liu Shuyuan;Wan Ning(School of Management,East China University of Science and Technology,Shanghai 200237,China;School of Management,Shanghai Engineering Institute,Shanghai 201306,China)

机构地区：[1]华东理工大学商学院,上海200237 [2]上海电机学院商学院,上海201306

出　　处：《科技管理研究》2018年第23期244-252,共9页Science and Technology Management Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"面向供应链减排视角的碳排放政策作用机理及其调适研究"(71573087);上海市浦江人才计划项目"基于供应链协调的碳减排优化方法及应用研究"(15PJC020)

摘　　要：研究基于消费者低碳偏好下,供应链中制造商对于信息收集与质量披露策略选择的问题,建立考虑消费者低碳偏好时的制造商和零售商之间的博弈模型;通过对信息收集和质量披露策略不同选择下供应链决策结果的比较,分析制造商在不同策略选择下的收益差异,得出质量披露成本和消费者低碳偏好差异程度与制造商策略选择之间的变化规律。最后,通过算例分析对于研究结论进行说明和验证。This paper studies the choice of manufacturers’ strategies for information collection and quality disclosure in the supply chain based on consumers’ low carbon preference, and establishes a game model between manufacturers and retailers considering consumers’ low carbon preference. By comparing the decision results of supply chain under different choices of information collection and quality disclosure strategies, analyzes the profit differences of manufacturers under different policy choices,the relationship between the cost of quality disclosure and the difference of consumers’ low carbon preference and the choice of manufacturer’s strategy is obtained. Finally, the conclusion of the study is explained and verified by example analysis.

关 键 词：信息不对称 低碳供应链 信息收集 质量披露 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理] F224.0[经济管理—国民经济]