管理层过度自信、产权性质与并购商誉  

Management Overconfidence,Nature of Property Rights and Goodwill from M&A Activities

作　　者：李丹蒙[1] 叶建芳[2] 卢思绮 曾森 Li Danmeng

机构地区：[1]华东理工大学商学院,200237 [2]上海财经大学会计与财务研究院,200433 [3]上海财经大学会计学院,200433 [4]西南证券股份有限公司,400023

出　　处：《会计研究》2018年第10期50-57,共8页Accounting Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目(71502060);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(WN1323008);教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目(13JJD790019);教育部重大研究项目(14JJD630005)

摘　　要：本文以沪深两市2007至2015年度的上市公司为研究样本,实证研究了管理层的过度自信与企业并购商誉之间的关系。研究结果发现,管理层的过度自信程度越高,公司当年新增的并购商誉越多。本文考虑了产权性质对上述研究的调节效应,发现相比于非国有控股公司,国有控股公司中管理层的过度自信对并购商誉的影响较弱。进一步研究发现,公司当年新增的并购商誉虽然对并购后1年公司业绩有正向影响,但该影响主要来自于管理非过度自信的上市公司。本文的研究结果对企业并购、管理层过度乐观以及商誉等领域的研究文献做出了有益的补充,为有关部门制定企业并购重组的政策法规和商誉的会计核算与披露政策提供了经验证据作为参考。Based on a sample of Chinese listed companies from 2007 to 2015,this paper examines the effect of management overconfidence on goodwill generated from merger & acquisition (M&A)activities.The article uses whether management members increases share holdings as the measurement of management overconfidence.This paper finds a positive relation between management overconfidence and goodwill generated from M&A activities. When considering the moderating effects of property rights,the paper shows that the effect of management overconfidence on goodwill is weaker for SOEs comparing with non SOEs.This paper further tests the effects of goodwill generated from M&A activities on future firm performance and finds that the contributions of goodwill to future firm performance are not sustainable.Our paper makes some contribution to the literature of M&A,management overconfidence,and goodwill research.This paper may also be useful to the policy making for M&A activities and the regulation of goodwill accounting and disclosure.

关 键 词：过度自信 产权性质 商誉 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F271[经济管理—国民经济] F272.91