党组织参与公司治理对国企高管隐性腐败的影响  

The Impact of the CPC's Organization Participation in Corporate Governance on the Recessive Corruption of the Executives in State Owned Enterprise

作　　者：严若森[1] 吏林山 Yan Ruosen;Li Linshan

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院

出　　处：《南开学报（哲学社会科学版）》2019年第1期176-190,共15页Nankai Journal:Philosophy,Literature and Social Science Edition

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70502024);教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划项目(NCET-11-0412)

摘　　要：党组织通过"双向进入"与"交叉任职"的方式参与公司治理已成为中国国有企业治理新一轮深化改革的重要组成部分,并已对国有企业高管隐性腐败产生了积极的抑制作用。以2013-2015年中国沪深两市A股国有上市公司为样本,就党组织参与公司治理对国有企业高管隐性腐败的影响及国有企业级别对此影响的调节效应进行的实证研究结果表明:(1)党组织参与公司治理能够较好地抑制国有企业高管隐性腐败;(2)较之于地方国有企业,中央国有企业的党组织参与公司治理能够对国有企业高管隐性腐败起到更大程度的抑制作用。党组织在参与公司治理并借此抑制国有企业高管隐性腐败的同时,尚须不断优化其参与公司治理的方式、层次与结构。Since China’s economy has entered a track of new normal development, the participation of the Communist party of China(CPC) in corporate governance through"two-way access"and"cross appointment"has played an important role in the deepening reform of China state-owned enterprises(SOEs). Based on the sample of A-share listed SOEs in China’s Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from the year 2013 to 2015, this study conducts empirical research on the impact of the CPC’s participation in corporate governance on the executives’ recessive corruption of SOEs and moderating effect of SOEs’ rank. It comes to the conclusions as follows:(1) CPC’s participation in corporate governance of SOEs would decrease the executives’ recessive corruption;(2) Compared with the local SOEs, the CPC’s participation of the central SOEs in corporate governance can decrease the executives’ recessive corruption at a higher level. Even though the CPC participation in SOEs corporate governance can restrain executives from recessive corruption in SOEs, they still need to optimize the way, level and structure of its participation in corporate governances.

关 键 词：国有企业 党组织 公司治理 高管隐性腐败 

分 类 号：F276.1[经济管理—企业管理] F271[经济管理—国民经济] D267.1[政治法律—政治学]