基于能力激励的委托代理机制设计  

Design of a Principal-Agent Mechanism Based on Ability Incentive

作　　者：马国旺[1] 孟卫东[1] MA Guowang;MENG Weidong(School of Economics and Business Administration,Chongqing University,Chongqing 400044,China)

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044

出　　处：《系统管理学报》2019年第1期31-39,共9页Journal of Systems & Management

摘　　要：运用委托代理激励理论,构建了基于信息经济学的委托代理博弈模型,深入分析了能力激励对委托代理契约和博弈决策的影响。研究结果表明:①实施能力激励可有效提高委托人期望收益,且对个人价值实现系数较高的代理人更加有效;②委托人承担培训成本时代理人的能力水平提高更多,且委托人可获得更高的期望收益;③信息成本与代理人风险规避程度有关,代理人风险规避系数越高信息成本越高。Based on information economics,the principal-agent theory is used to construct a game model,and the influence of ability incentive on principal-agent contract and game decision making was analyzed.The results of the study show that ability incentive can effectively improve the expected revenue of the principal,which is more effective for the agent with a higher coefficient of individual value.Besides,the ability of the agent will be more increased when the principal undertakes the training costs,and the principal will get more expected revenue.In addition,information cost is connected to the measures taken by the agent for risk aversion,and the higher the coefficient of the measures for risk aversion,the greater the information cost.

关 键 词：委托代理 能力激励 信息成本 学习效应 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]