异质委托情境下国企过度自信高管激励合同设计  

Influence of Executives’ Overconfidence Behavior of State-Owned Enterprises on Incentive Contract in the Context of Heterogeneous Agent

作　　者：王垒[1] 刘新民[1] 丁黎黎[2] WANG Lei;LIU Xinmin;DING Lili(College of Economics and Management,Shandong University of Science and Technology,Qingdao 266590,Shandong,China;School of Economics,Ocean University of China,Qingdao 266100,Shandong,China)

机构地区：[1]山东科技大学经济管理学院,山东青岛266590 [2]中国海洋大学经济学院,山东青岛266100

出　　处：《系统管理学报》2019年第1期134-140,154,共8页Journal of Systems & Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(71371111);国家社会科学基金青年项目(18CGL009);教育部人文社科规划青年基金资助项目(17YJC630154);山东省社会科学规划资助项目(18CCXJ15);山东科技大学科研创新团队项目(2015TDJH103);山东科技大学人才引进科研启动基金资助项目(2017RCJJ1019)

摘　　要：考虑国企高管代理人表现出的过度精确和过高估计两种不同过度自信心理形式,分析了国企高管在异质委托情境下,不同过度自信形式对国有股东和非国有股东纳什均衡合同中最优契约激励系数的影响机理。通过构建包含国有股东、非国有股东和国企高管三方博弈模型发现:在异质委托情境下,国企高管过度精确的自信行为提高了纳什均衡合同中促进经济任务努力的最优激励系数,而对纳什均衡合同中促进社会任务努力的最优激励系数没有影响;国企高管过高估计的自信行为提高了纳什均衡合同中促进社会任务努力的最优激励系数,而对纳什均衡合同中促进经济任务努力的最优激励系数没有影响。从国企高管代理人的努力类型来看,过度精确的自信行为降低了自身对经济任务的努力水平,而过高估计的自信行为提高了自身对社会任务的努力水平。在我国当前推进国有企业混合所有制改革背景下,该契约理论模型将委托代理参与人扩展到包含国有股东、非国有股东和国企高管三方参与人的基础上,充分考虑了非理性国企高管对国企双重任务的行为差异,研究结论可对完善国企治理及高管薪酬机制提供新的参考。In the context of heterogeneous agent of state-owned enterprises,this paper introduced the overconfidence behavior of excessive accuracy and high estimation of state-owned enterprises’ executives,and analyzed the impact of agents’ different overconfidence behavior on the optimal incentive contract design of the Nash equilibrium contracts between governmental and social shareholders.By developing a trial-gaming model including state-owned shareholders,non state-owned shareholders,and state-owned enterprises’ executives,this study revealed that the excessive accuracy in overconfidence behavior of executives of state-owned enterprises helped to improve the optimal incentive of Nash equilibrium for political effort in the context of heterogeneous agent,but it had no influence on promoting the Nash equilibrium contract for economic effort.The high estimation in overconfidence behavior increased the optimal incentive of Nash equilibrium for political effort in the context of heterogeneous agent,but it had no influence on promoting the Nash equilibrium contract for economic effort.Viewing from the agents’ effort,the excessive accuracy in overconfidence behavior decreased their own political effort;the high estimation in overconfidence improved their economic effort.The contract theory model in this paper extended the principal-agents’ participation to state-owned shareholders,non state-owned shareholders,and executives of state-owned enterprises,taking into consideration the behavioral differences of non-rational SOE executives on dual task of state-owned enterprises.This paper can provide certain references for improving governance and executive compensation mechanism of state-owned enterprises under the mixed ownership reform of the state-owned economy in China.

关 键 词：委托代理 异质股东 过度自信 国有企业 激励合同 

分 类 号：F272.91[经济管理—企业管理]