知名品牌制造商与零售商的联合消费者返利促销  

Joint National Brand Consumer Rebates in the Competition Between a National Brand and a Private Label Retailer

作　　者：罗美玲[1,2,3,4] 李刚 梁冬寒[2,3,4] LUO Meiling;LI Gang;LIANG Donghan(College of Management Science,Chengdu University of Technology,Chengdu 610059,China;The State Key Lab for Manufacturing Systems Engineering、The Key Lab of the Ministry of Education for Process Control & Efficiency Engineering,School of Management、Xi'an Jiaotong University,Xi'an 710049,China)

机构地区：[1]成都理工大学管理科学学院,成都610059 [2]西安交通大学管理学院 [3]机械制造系统工程国家重点实验室 [4]过程控制与效率工程教育部重点实验室,西安710049

出　　处：《系统管理学报》2019年第1期174-184,共11页Journal of Systems & Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71701025;71832011)

摘　　要：在由知名品牌制造商和拥有自有品牌的零售商组成的二级供应链中,零售商同时出售知名品牌和自有品牌产品。考虑制造商为知名品牌实施消费者返利促销,分别研究了在制造商领导和零售商领导的供应链结构中,零售商为知名品牌提供和不提供消费者返利两种情形下的均衡策略,并进一步讨论了零售商为知名品牌提供返利的参数条件。研究结果表明,在制造商领导的供应链中,零售商实施知名品牌返利促销的机率更大,且返利使博弈双方受益。In a two-stage supply chain with a national brand manufacturer and a retailer who has a private label,the retailer sells both the national brand and the private label,and the two products are substitutive.When the manufacturer provides consumer rebates for the national brand,the equilibrium strategies when the retailer provides or does not provide consumer rebates for the national brand in a manufacturer-led and a retailer-led supply chain were analyzed,respectively.Moreover,the boundary parameter conditions of the retailer’s willingness to participate in consumer rebates for the national brand were derived.The results show that in a manufacturer-led supply chain,the retailer is more willing to provide consumer rebates for the national brand,and the consumer rebates for the national brand always benefit both the manufacturer and the retailer.

关 键 词：供应链管理 消费者返利 自有品牌 渠道冲突 品牌竞争 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]