两权偏离下终极股东控制对公司价值的影响——来自沪深A股民营上市公司的经验证据  

On Impact of Ultimate Controlling Shareholders on Company Value under Rights Separation: Empirical Evidence from A-share Private Listed Companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen

作　　者：刘云珊[1] LIU Yun-shan(Yunnan Jiaotong College,Kunming,Yunnan,650101,China)

机构地区：[1]云南交通职业技术学院,云南昆明650101

出　　处：《武汉商学院学报》2018年第6期52-56,共5页Journal of Wuhan Business University

摘　　要：在公司治理中始终存在终极股东私有公司控制权利益或以控制董事会行为格局而发生公司价值的侵占效应,以民营公司愈发严重。以沪深A股民营上市公司2013-2017年的数据为研究样本,探讨了控制权与现金流权偏离下终极股东控制与公司价值的关系。结果发现:两权偏离度越大,公司价值就越低;在控制权水平较低时,两权分离与公司值呈显著负相关,终极股东担任核心管理职位会进一步降低公司价值;在控制权水平较高时,两权偏离并不对公司价值有显著影响,终极股东若任职管理层有助于提升公司价值。无论控制权水平的高或低,董事会行为与终极股东关系格局密切相关时,会引发董事会羊群行为,进而显著地抑制公司价值。In company management, there has always been cases that the company value is misappropriated caused by the interests of ultimate shareholders’ controlling rights or by controlling the behavior of the board of directors, and it is particularly serious among private companies. The relationship between ultimate shareholder controlling and company value is studied in the context of controlling rights deviating from cash flow rights with the data of private listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share market from 2013 to 2017. The study results are as follows. First, the greater the two rights deviate, the lower the company value is. Second, when the controlling level is in low level, the deviation degree of the two rights is significantly negatively correlated with the company value and an ultimate shareholder in the core management position will further reduce the company value. Third, when the controlling level is high, the deviation degree of the two rights does not have significant influence on the company value and an ultimate shareholder in the core management position will further enhance the company value. Fourth, when the board of directors is closely related to the ultimate shareholders,herd behavior will occur in the board of directors;consequently, the company value will be obviously inhibited,regardless of the controlling level.

关 键 词：终极股东控制 两权偏离 董事会行为 公司价值 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]