怀特海式的过程泛心论  

Whiteheadian Process Panpsychism

作　　者：李健民[1] LI Jian-min(School of Philosophy,Renmin University of China,Beijing 100872,China)

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学哲学院,北京100872

出　　处：《自然辩证法研究》2019年第1期21-26,共6页Studies in Dialectics of Nature

摘　　要：从过程哲学的视角看,物理主义与泛心论都是某种"实体本体论",始终未离开二元论的讨论框架。过程本体论主张以一种动态的、创造性的过程即"现实实有"取代机械唯物论的静态实体。基于过程本体论之上的新版泛心论,可称为"怀特海式的过程泛心论",主张一种动态的、普遍关联的实在观,以一元的"过程"突破传统物理主义与泛心论进路的二元论局限,一定程度上弥合了心身间的认识鸿沟,消解了"难问题"与"组合问题",成为心身问题思考的新进路。It can be found that both physicalism and panpsychism are a kind of"substance ontology"from the perspective of process philosophy which never leave the dualism framework of discussion. Whitehead’s process ontology argues that the static entity of mechanic materialism should be replaced by"actual entity"which is a kind of dynamic and creative process. The new kind of panpsychism basing on the process ontology can be called" Whiteheadian process panpsychism". It argues for a dynamic and universally related view of reality. This approach breaks the dualism limitation of traditional physicalism and panpsychism by the monistic process and bridges epistemology gap between mind and body to a certain extent. It eliminates"hard problem"and"combination problem"and becomes the new approach of the thinking of mind-body problem.

关 键 词：心身问题 实体本体论 过程泛心论 

分 类 号：N031[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]