非线性需求下两类价格歧视交互效应的动态博弈分析  

Analysis on Interaction Effect of Two Methods of Price Discrimination under Non-linear Demand Function Based on Dynamic Game Theory

作　　者：陈绍刚[1] 王浩先 CHEN Shao-gang;WANG Hao-xian(School of Mathematics,University of Electronic Science and Technology of China,Chengdu 610054,China)

机构地区：[1]电子科技大学数学科学学院,四川成都611731

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2019年第2期84-90,共7页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

摘　　要：在一类非线性需求函数的条件下,基于完全信息动态博弈模型,对两寡头厂商在竞争状态下同时实施二度与三度价格歧视的定价方法进行了研究,讨论了两厂商在面对两个子市场情形下,分别对各子市场的需求区间进行两段分段时的利润最大化问题,得出了在二三度价格歧视下两厂商的均衡产量与分段点,为寡头厂商的生产决策提供了理论依据.Under the condition of non-linear demand function, based on the complete information dynamic game model, it studies two oligopoly manufacturers’ price pricing method which used second-degree and third-degree price discrimination in competitive state and discuss the problem of two manufacturers’ profit maximization facing two sub-markets with two phase approach. We find the methods and the results of getting the equilibrium production and segment points of the two manufacturers under the second-degree and third-degree price discrimination. It provides a theoretical basis for the production decision of oligopoly manufacturers.

关 键 词：价格歧视 寡头竞争 非线性需求 动态博弈 交互效应 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]