信息共享——效应与问题  

Information Sharing——Effects and Problems

作　　者：霍沛军[1] 

机构地区：[1]清华大学经济管理学院,北京100084

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2002年第6期105-107,共3页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金 ( 70 0 71 0 1 6 )

摘　　要：利用一个允许初始信息量不对称的模型考虑双寡头企业进行信息共享时的效应 .双寡头进行信息共享后 ,每个企业的利润以及消费者剩余和社会福利都得以增加 .但在信息共享中存在着“囚徒困境”问题 ,即每个企业都试图通过减少给予另一个企业的信息来增加自己的利润 ,但结果每个企业的利润都降低 ,消费者剩余和社会福利也随之降低 .This paper considers the effects of information sharing of a duopoly using a model with initial information asymmetry. Not only each firm′s profit but also the consumers′ surplus and social welfare increase after the duopoly share their information. However, Prisoners′ Dilemma exists in information sharing, i.e., each firm tries to increase its profit through sending lower information to its counterpart, but the result is that each firm′s profit as well as the consumers′ surplus and social welfare decrease.

关 键 词：信息共享 效应 COURNOT均衡 NASH均衡 经济学 

分 类 号：F224.13[经济管理—国民经济]