公司兼并中补偿机制的非完全性问题研究  

On the incompleteness of compensation mechanism in the course of merging joint stock companies

作　　者：冯套柱[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安科技学院管理系,陕西西安710054

出　　处：《西安科技学院学报》2002年第2期211-215,共5页

摘　　要：讨论股份公司之间进行兼并的效率问题。指出股份制下公司兼并过程中 ,即使允许贿赂 ,无论是大股东还是经理决策 ,部分帕累托最优的兼并区域仍不能实现。也就是说 ,在股份制下 ,“金降落伞”The efficiency in the merging joint stock companies is discussed. The author points out that under the joint stock system, even if bribery is allowed in the course of merging, Pareto optimality can not be completely fulfilled, whether the big shareholder or manager be the decision maker or not. In other words, under such system, the incompleteness of the compensation mechanism of 'gold parachute' can not be avoided indeed.

关 键 词：公司兼并 帕累托最优 补偿机制 贿赂 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理]