允许收购竞争者时创新企业的最优策略  

Optimal Policies of an Innovating Firm Permitted to Take over Its Competitor

作　　者：霍沛军[1] 

机构地区：[1]清华大学经济管理学院,北京100084

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2002年第7期9-16,共8页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金 (70 0 710 16

摘　　要：双寡头中有一个企业从事成本降低型研究与发展 (R&D) .创新企业可以在进行 R&D之前或之后收购另一企业 ,分别称为事前收购和事后收购 .本文首先对事前收购和事后收购两种策略进行对比分析 .结果表明 ,当 R&D溢出较大时创新企业将选择事前收购 ,而溢出较小时将选择事后收购 .值得注意的是 ,创新企业选择的收购策略同时也使消费者剩余和 R&D投资达到最大 .最后将事前和事后收购分别与不收购进行对比 .不收购总不是创新企业的最优策略 ,但在有些情况下 ,不收购时的One firm conducts cost\|reducing R&D in a duopoly. The innovating firm may take over its rival either before or after the R&D activities are conducted. The corresponding takeover policies are called ex\|ante takeover and ex\|post takeover, respectively. The first part of the paper makes a comparison between ex\|ante takeover and ex\|post takeover. It is shown that, the innovating firm chooses ex\|ante takeover for large spillover and ex\|post takeover for small spillover. It is remarkable that the takeover policy chosen by the innovating firm also maximizes R&D investment and consumer surplus. The second part of the paper compares no takeover with ex\|post takeover and ex\|ante takeover, respectively. No takeover is never the innovating firm's optimal policy, but it maximizes R&D investment and consumer surplus under some cases.

关 键 词：收购竞争者 创新企业 最优策略 博弈分析 

分 类 号：F27[经济管理—企业管理]