默会知识论视野中的科学主义和人本主义之争——论波兰尼对斯诺问题的回应  

The Debate Between Scientism and Humanism in the Perspective of the Theory of tacit knowledge --On Polanyi's Response to "Snow's Problem

作　　者：郁振华[1] 

机构地区：[1]华东师大哲学系,上海200062

出　　处：《复旦学报（社会科学版）》2002年第4期39-45,共7页Fudan Journal（Social Sciences）

摘　　要：波兰尼立足于默会知识论对斯诺问题作了独特的回应 ,实现了对实证主义者和诠释学者、新康德主义者的双重超越 ,克服了自然科学和人的研究之间的假想的鸿沟 ,确立了两者之间的连续性。但是 ,连续性不排除根本性的差异 ,在他的晚年 ,波兰尼在连续性的框架之中 ,探讨了科学意义和人文意义的区别。波兰尼的这项研究 ,体现了参与者视角的主导性。Michael Polanyi responds to Snow's Problem in a unique way. His strategy transcends the opposition between positivism and the secessionist movement (including hermeneuticians and neo Kantians). He bridged the supposed gap between natural sciences and the study of man and established the continuity between them. However, continuity does not preclude fundamental distinctions. In his later years, he investigated, within the framework of continuity, the distinctions between scientific meanings and humanistic meanings. This paper points out that Polanyi's studies demonstrate the predominance of the participant's perspective, the recovery of the hermeneutic dimension of science and the constructive use of Heidegger's 'being in the world'.

关 键 词：科学主义 人本主义 波兰尼 斯诺 默会知识论 实证主义科学观 脱离主义 诠释学 海德格尔 “在世”思想 

分 类 号：N031[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]