水污染物排放权交易市场中的演化博弈分析  

Analysis on the Water Pollutant Emission in Trading Market by Evolutionary Game

作　　者：陈柳鑫[1] 陈曦[1] 于彤[1] 

机构地区：[1]河海大学商学院,江苏南京211100

出　　处：《生态经济》2014年第8期37-41,共5页Ecological Economy

基　　金：2012南京留学人员科技活动项目(1063/B12044)

摘　　要：将演化博弈理论运用于排放权交易之中,分别通过对排污权交易中的交易企业之间以及交易企业和政府监管部门的复制动态及其进化稳定策略进行分析,求出了各自的复制动态方程以及进化稳定策略,并进行了稳定性分析。研究表明:排污权交易企业之间的演化博弈存在唯一的进化稳定策略;交易企业和政府监管部门的演化博弈情况复杂,在不同的监管成本、监管程度、企业合谋收益下,存在不同的进化稳定策略,其中(H,H)演化策略是期望的系统演化方向。In this study, evolutionary game theory was applied in emissions right trading to analyze the replicated dynamics and evolutionary stable strategy among trading enterprises and government regulators in transaction. The paper found out the replicated dynamic equations and evolutionary stable strategies respectively and a stability analysis was carried out based on above information. Results showed that only evolutionary stable strategy just existed in the evolutionary game between the trading companies. While the evolutionary game between the trading enterprises and government regulars was more complex..The evolutionary stable strategy differed as regulatory costs, the regulation degree and corporate collusion income differ, while the （H, H） policy was expected in evolution direction in system.

关 键 词：排污权 演化博弈 交易方 政府监管 

分 类 号：F276[经济管理—企业管理]