考虑外部性的生态产业共生网络演化博弈分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Eco-Industrial Symbiosis Network Considering Externality

作　　者：李春发[1] 冯立攀 

机构地区：[1]天津理工大学管理学院,天津300384

出　　处：《复杂系统与复杂性科学》2014年第3期58-64,共7页Complex Systems and Complexity Science

基　　金：天津市科技计划项目(12ZLZLZF06300)

摘　　要：以考虑外部性效应的生态产业共生网络(EISN)的生产型企业与分解型企业间的合作竞争关系为研究对象,通过建立相应的演化博弈模型和复制动态方程,分析了不完全信息和有限理性条件下,外部性效应对EISN演化和长期均衡的影响。研究结果表明,在考虑外部性条件下,EISN的长期均衡受博弈行为的初始状态、外部性效应期望收益、选择合作的支付成本和贴现因子影响。同时以鲁北生态产业园为案例,对研究结论进行了数值验证,并提出了相关的政策建议。Externality is an essential factor in the formulation and evolution of eco-industrial symbiosis network.With considering the externality,we study the co-opetition relationship between the producer enterprises and decomposer enterprises in EISN,and by conducting the corresponding evolutionary game model and replicator dynamic equation,the impact of externality on the evolution and long-term equilibrium of EISN under imperfect and bounded rationality is analyzed.The result shows that the long-term equilibrium of the EISN is affected by the initial state of the game occurring,the expectation of the external effect benefits,the payment cost to choice the cooperative strategy and the discount factors when taking the externality into consideration.Finally,taking the Lubei eco-industrial park as the case,we verify the conclusions by numerical examples and propose some valid suggestions.

关 键 词：生态产业共生网络 外部性 演化博弈 复制动态方程 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]