基于公平偏好的三阶段锦标激励模型研究  

Study on Three-period Tournament Incentives Model Based on Fairness Preferences

作　　者：刘新民[1] 刘晨曦[1] 纪大琳 

机构地区：[1]山东科技大学经济管理学院,山东青岛266590 [2]中国农业银行招远支行,山东烟台265400

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2014年第3期257-263,共7页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71371111);高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金资助项目(20133718110009);山东科技大学杰出青年和创新团队项目(2011KYJQ103;2011KYTD104)

摘　　要：为解决多代理人激励及委托人道德风险问题,本文基于公平偏好理论,构建了三阶段锦标激励模型,通过数理推导研究委托人最大化目标下公平偏好与工资差距对代理人努力水平和拆台行为的影响,并对不同晋升过程下代理人各阶段的努力水平进行比较。结果表明,代理人的努力水平与拆台行为同升同降,公平偏好降低代理人的努力水平和拆台行为,而工资差距提高代理人的努力水平和拆台行为,且无论晋升过程如何,代理人在第一阶段的努力水平均大于其第三阶段的努力水平。本文拓展了行为经济学视角下基于委托代理框架的锦标赛激励研究。In order to solve the multi-agent incentives and the principal＇s moral hazard problems,based on fairness preferences,the paper builds three-period tournament incentives model and discusses the effect of fairness preferences and wage spreads on the agent＇s effort level and sabotage through the mathematical induction method. Then the paper compares agent＇s effort level of each stage under different promotion process. The results show that agent＇s effort level and sabotage change in the same way,and fairness preferences of agent reduce the agent＇s effort level and sabotage while wage spreads improve the agent＇s effort level and sabotage. And agent＇s effort level in the first period is always higher than it in the third period regardless of the promotion process. The paper expands the study of tournament incentives from the perspective of behavioral economics based on principal-agent model.

关 键 词：企业管理 三阶段锦标激励 FS模型 公平偏好 拆台行为 委托代理模型 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理]