公允价值变动损益与高管薪酬敏感性  

Gains and Losses Resulting from Changes in Fair Value and the Sensitivity of Executive Pay

作　　者：周林洁[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国青年政治学院经济系,北京100089

出　　处：《兰州大学学报（社会科学版）》2014年第3期116-122,共7页Journal of Lanzhou University（Social Sciences）

基　　金：共青团中央中国青年政治学院资助课题(189070619)

摘　　要：研究了公允价值变动损益与高管薪酬敏感性问题。结果发现,公允价值变动损益中包含的利润信息,并未完全反映在企业高管薪酬设计中,当为公允价值变动收益时,与高管薪酬正相关,当为公允价值变动损失时,与高管薪酬之间没有显著关系。因此,上市公司高管通过操纵公允价值变动损益以增加其自身收益。表明:当为公允价值变动损失时,其他利润更高,因此,公允价值变动损失可能与上市公司利润平滑有关。This paper studies gains and losses resulting from changes in fair value and the sensitivity of executive pay. The result shows that the profit information contained in the gains and losses resulting from changes in fair value is not fairly reflected in the design of executive pay. Gains are reflected in the executive pay while losses are not. In order to increase their own income, the executives of listed companies may manipulate gains or losses resulting from changes in fair value. It indicates when it is losses resulting from the change in fair value, other profits will correspondingly be increased. Conclusion is drawn that co-relation exists between loSses resulting from the change in fair value and income smoothing.

关 键 词：公司治理 企业业绩 公允价值 变动损益 高管薪酬 

分 类 号：F244[经济管理—劳动经济]