地方官员异地更替对企业R&D投资具有“挤出”效应吗?  

Does the Geographical Rotation of Local Governors Have the Crowding Out Effect on Firm's R&D Investment?

作　　者：何山[1] 李后建[2] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆沙坪坝400044 [2]四川农业大学经济管理学院,四川成都611130

出　　处：《产业经济研究》2014年第4期30-40,共11页Industrial Economics Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金"基于企业内部与环境创新要素的资源型企业创新能力评价指标体系研究"(项目编号:71062002);国家社科青年资金"中国式分权下的地方政府质量提升路径研究"(项目编号:12CJL022)的科研资助

摘　　要：本文揭示了领导干部异地交流这一制度安排对中国企业R＆D投资行为的影响。手工搜集了省级地方官员异地更替的相关经验数据，并结合2005～2007年中国工业企业数据中60多万个企业R＆D投资的相关数据，从实证角度考察了地方官员异地更替对辖区内R＆D投资行为的影响。结果发现：地方官员异地更替对企业，尤其是国有企业R＆D投资具有显著的“挤出”效应。进一步研究发现，市场化进程有利于弱化地方官员异地更替对企业，尤其是国有企业R＆D投资的“挤出”效应。此外，相对于非高新技术企业而言，地方官员异地更替对高新技术企业的R＆D投资产生更强的“挤出”效应。最后，地方官员异地更替对隶属关系特征不同的国有企业R＆D投资具有显著差异。本文的研究丰富和拓展了政府干预与R＆D投资理论的相关文献，为进一步理解地方官员干预企业R＆D投资和经济转型提供了新的经验证据。This paper investigates the effects of the geographical rotation of leading cadres as an institutional arrangementon R＆D investment behavior of Chinese firms. Using a hand-collected sample including the geographical rotation data of localgovernors and R＆D data of more than 600,000 firms from 2005 to 2007, this paper empirically studies the effects of the geo-graphical rotation of local governors on the area of R＆D investment behavior. The results show that the geographical rotation oflocal governors has a significantly lower probability of investing on firm＇s R＆D, especially state-owned firm＇s R＆D. Furtherstudy found that the evolvement of marketization is conductive to curb the crowding out effect of the geographical rotation of lo-cal governors on firm＇s R＆D investment, especially state-owned firm＇s R＆D investment. Furthermore, compared to non high-tech firms, the geographical rotation of local governors has stronger crowding out effect on high-tecb firms＇ R＆D investment.Our study enriches the literature of government intervention and R＆D investment theory, offering new empirical evidence tofurther understand local governors intervening finn＇s R＆D investment and economic transction.

关 键 词：地方官员异地更替 企业R&D投资 “挤出”效应 所有制 高新技术企业 

分 类 号：F062.9[经济管理—政治经济学]