董事网络增进企业债务融资的作用机理研究  

A Study on the Mechanism of Board Networks Promoting Debt Financing of Enterprises

作　　者：王营[1] 曹廷求[1] 

机构地区：[1]山东大学经济学院,山东济南250100

出　　处：《金融研究》2014年第7期189-206,共18页Journal of Financial Research

基　　金：国家社科基金重大项目(12&ZD069);国家自然科学基金(71272119);国家自然科学基金(71302088);山东省"泰山学者"建设工程专项经费;银兴经济研究基金的资助

摘　　要：企业可以借助关系网络获取稀缺资源,进而制定风险小和收益大的融资决策。研究发现,上市公司嵌入董事网络有助于获取债务融资,这主要通过影响融资规模、融资成本以及期限结构的途径实现。董事网络借助中心位置和结构洞位置对融资规模和长期债务产生显著正向影响、对融资成本和短期债务产生显著负向影响。在信息不对称冲击下,董事网络同样对上市公司的债务融资发挥积极作用,这主要体现在更大的融资规模、更低的融资成本以及更长的债务期限。总之,董事网络嵌入有助于上市公司获取债务融资,并且能够缓解公司丑闻产生的负面冲击。由此,本文将董事网络的资源获取作用具体化并厘清了其增进债务融资作用机理,从而为上市公司如何构建和优化董事网络提供了融资方面的借鉴。The enterprises can benefit from social network in the form of scarce resources, thereby making low- risk and high - return financing decision. Our paper finds that the embedment of board network of the listedcompanies contributes to accessing debt resources by means of debt scale, cost of debt and debt maturity. Withthe help of the central position and structural holes, interlocking directorates play significantly positive roles indebt scale and long - term liabilities and negative effects in cost of debt and current liabilities. We further explore and investigate the relationship between interlocking directorates and debt financing when informationasymmetric shocks happening, that is, corporate scandals. Interloeklng directorates holdlng the central positionor the structural holes both have positive effects on debt financing, mainly reflecting in more debt scale, lowercost of debt and more long - term debts. In a word, the embedment of board networks contributes to accessingdebt resources and mitigates information asymmetric shocks due to corporate scandals during the financingprocess. Ultimately, this paper theoretically crystallizes the resource - acquisition ability of board networks andclarifies its mechanisms, practically instructing the listed companies in interlocking.

关 键 词：董事网络 信息不对称冲击 债务融资 

分 类 号：F272.91[经济管理—企业管理] F275[经济管理—国民经济]