基于信息不对称的企业费用检举渠道研究  

Research on Prosecution Channel of Enterprise Expense Based on Asymmetric Information

作　　者：刘博[1] 干胜道[2] 陈彬[2] 

机构地区：[1]安徽财经大学会计学院,安徽蚌埠233030 [2]四川大学商学院,四川成都610064

出　　处：《石家庄经济学院学报》2014年第3期83-88,共6页Journal of Shijiazhuang University of Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70672013);教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划(NCET-08-0384);国家社科基金(13BJY015)

摘　　要：在企业的费用控制过程中,由于信息不对称,费用的使用者往往比上层管理者掌握更多的信息,从而容易导致费用超支、滥用甚至贪污、挪用等情况发生。介绍了企业费用控制中一种重要的方法——检举渠道,这一方法有利于减少监督和调查成本、确保企业资金安全和减少舞弊,对于企业费用控制非常有效。通过建立费用使用者和检举者的博弈模型,分析了影响费用使用者舞弊概率的因素和影响检举者检举概率的因素,并结合企业的实际情况,从明确企业员工的检举权利、设立接受检举的部门、拓宽检举者的信息获取渠道以及对检举人检举成功的奖励等几个方面对费用检举机制提出了相应的建议。In the expense control process , due to information asymmetry , expense users often have more information than the upper managers , which tends to lead to expense overruns , abuse and even corruption , embezzlement .In this article, prosecution channel ,an important method of expense control is brought forward ,which is beneficial to cutting down supervision and investigation cost ,ensuring the safety of enterprise funds and reducing fraud , and is very effective for control of corporate expenses .By establishing the game model of expense users and prosecutors , this article analyzes the factors that affect the expense of user fraud probability and the prosecutors report probabili -ty.Combined with the actual situation of the enterprise , recommendations for the expense prosecution mechanism are set up, which include clearing corporate staff report rights , setting up department to accept prosecution , broad-ening the prosecutor＇s access to information and reward the successful prosecution .

关 键 词：信息不对称 费用控制 检举渠道 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]