内部控制质量对代理成本影响的实证研究——基于2009-2011年中小板上市公司数据  

An Empirical Study on the Influence of the Quality of Internal Control on Agency Cost——Study Based on the Data about Small and Medium-sized Listing Corporation in 2009-2011

作　　者：陈婷[1] 赵良庆[1] 

机构地区：[1]安徽农业大学经济管理学院,安徽合肥230000

出　　处：《长沙理工大学学报（社会科学版）》2014年第4期72-76,共5页Journal of Changsha University of Science and Technology：Social Science

摘　　要：我国上市公司各类代理成本普遍偏高,内部控制质量却普遍偏低,研究表明,高质量的内部控制明显有利于降低管理者和股东之间以及债权人与股东之间的代理成本,内控制数与大小股东之间的代理成本也成负相关关系,但是结果在0.05的水平上不显著。这说明我国企业要想降低代理成本进而提高公司治理水平,就应该建立、完善内部控制制度。The agency cost of Chinese listing corporation is generally high, but on the contrary, the quality of internal control is low. The research results show that high quality internal control is significantly beneficial for reducing agency costs between managers and shareholders as well as that between creditors and shareholders. In addition, the internal control index and agency costs between minority and majority shareholders are negatively correlated, but the result is not significant at the level of 0. 05. This shows that Chinese enterprises should establish and perfect the internal control system so as to reduce the agency cost and then improve the corporate governance level.

关 键 词：内部控制质量 代理成本 中小板 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]