林权改革过程中的林农信贷约束及其对策研究  

Research on the Forestry Farmers' Credit Constraints and the Countermeasures in the Process of the State-Owned Forest Tenure Reform

作　　者：袁朝霞[1] 秦义春[1] 王玲玲[2] 谢仲麟 

机构地区：[1]中国人民银行南宁中心支行,广西南宁530028 [2]中国人民银行来宾市中心支行,广西来宾546100 [3]中国人民银行钦州市中心支行,广西钦州535099

出　　处：《区域金融研究》2014年第7期18-24,共7页Journal of Regional Financial Research

摘　　要：本文首次将显性和隐性约束纳入林农信贷约束模型中,分析得出信息不对称是造成林农信贷约束的主因,而提高林农违约成本是解决信贷供求双方信息缺口最直接有效的方式。本文通过科学设置问卷的方式识别出约56%的林农有效信贷需求受到约束(包括显性和隐性约束),正是因为林权配套改革不彻底,加之我国林业经济小而分散的特征以及信贷供给方的垄断因素等加重了信息不对称程度,导致林农信贷约束难以解除。This article introduces the explicit and implicit constraints into model for the first time. It concludes that the information asymmetry is a major the forestry farmers＇ credit constraint cause of forestry farmers＇ credit constraints, and raising the cost of default is the most direct and effective way to solve information gap between credit supplies and demands. Questionnaire investigation shows that about 56 percent of the forestry farmers＇ effective demands for credit are restrained （including the explicit and implicit constraints）. Owing to the faultiness of supporting measures in the state-owned forest tenure reform, characteristic of China＇ s forestry economy and the rural credit markets monopoly, the information gap remains, and the credit constraints on forestry farmers are difficult to be removed.

关 键 词：林权改革 林农 信贷约束 

分 类 号：F832.43[经济管理—金融学]