创始高管团队薪酬激励对真实盈余管理的影响研究  

Influence of the Original TMT's Compensation Incentives on Real Earnings Management

作　　者：刘新民[1] 张莹[1] 王垒[1] 

机构地区：[1]山东科技大学经济管理学院,山东青岛266590

出　　处：《审计与经济研究》2014年第4期61-70,共10页Journal of Audit & Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71371111);高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金资助课题(20133718110009);山东省优秀中青年科学家科研奖励基金项目(BS2013SF019);山东科技大学科研创新团队(2011KYTU104)

摘　　要：以2009—2012年的创业板市场上市公司为样本,研究了创始高管团队不同薪酬激励形式对真实盈余管理水平的影响。结果发现,创始高管团队的货币薪酬、在职消费程度均与真实盈余管理水平存在一种显著的U型曲线关系,表明了货币薪酬和在职消费对真实盈余管理的两面性影响。而创始高管团队的股权薪酬与真实盈余管理水平正相关,这表明并不是股权薪酬越高,真实盈余管理水平越低,这意味着提高股权薪酬会加大对真实盈余管理的诱发行为。This paper investigated the influence of the original TMT＇s compensation incentives on real earnings management u- sing samples of listed companies on GEM during 2009--2012. The empirical result is that original TMT＇s monetary compensation and non-pecuniary compensation have the U-shape relation with the level of real earnings management, which indicates the influences of both-sides on the level of real earnings management. While stock-based compensation shows a positive relation to real earnings management, indicating that the stock-based compensation is far from being higher, the level of real earnings management is lower, and blindly improving stock-based compensation will induce real earnings management.

关 键 词：创始高管团队 货币薪酬 股权薪酬 在职消费 真实盈余管理 创业板市场 

分 类 号：F234.4[经济管理—会计学]