民营金字塔结构、产品竞争市场与企业创新投入  

Private Pyramid Structure,Product Market Competition and Innovation Investment

作　　者：熊艳[1] 

机构地区：[1]山东财经大学会计学院,济南250014

出　　处：《软科学》2014年第8期17-20,41,共5页Soft Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(11CGL096);山东省社会科学规划青年项目(13DGLJ09)

摘　　要：以2009~2012年深市667家民营上市公司为样本检验金字塔结构掏空理论,结果发现：民营金字塔结构中,终极控股股东两权分离度与企业创新投入显著正相关。民营金字塔结构中关于创新投入出现一般掏空理论与现实之间的反差。实证结果还表明,民营金字塔两权分离度与产品市场竞争共同交互影响企业创新投资,高两权分离度下较高创新投资不如低分离度下创新投资对业绩影响正向作用大,说明两权分离度较高时创新投资存在一些低效率投资。General pyramid tunneling theory in 667 private listing enterprises from 2009 to 2012 in Shenzhen stock market as samples to test the relationship. The results show the relationship between deviation of controlling right and cash flow right and innovation investment was positive. Innovation investment appeared contrast between tunneling theory and the reality in the private pyramid structure. The results also show that the innovation investment was interacted by the separation of two rights and product market competition in the private Pyramid structure. The positive effect of innovation investment on performance was much larger in low separation of the two rights tha9 in high separation of the two rights. This shows that innovation investment has some low efficiency in higher separation of the two rights.

关 键 词：两权分离度 控制层级 产品竞争市场 创新投入 高阶交互效应 

分 类 号：F276[经济管理—企业管理]