集中式股权结构、公司控制权配置与并购绩效——基于中国上市公司2004～2012年股权收购的证据  

Centralized Ownership Structure, Allocation of Control Rights and M&A Performance——Evidence from the Equity Acquisition of Chinese Listed Companies from 2004 to 2012

作　　者：周瑜胜[1,2] 宋光辉[2] 

机构地区：[1]广东外语外贸大学管理学院,广东广州510006 [2]华南理工大学管理学院,广东广州510641

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2014年第8期72-83,共12页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社科基金项目(12CJY006);教育部人文社科基金规划项目(10YJA630131);广州市哲学社科规划项目(10Y13)

摘　　要：集中式股权结构中大股东拥有公司控制权,其特征明显不同于分散式股权结构中管理层拥有的控制权,其对并购绩效的影响也是完全不同的,国内外研究对此关注甚少。针对2004~2012年中国上市公司的股权收购样本,运用丰富变量刻画集中式股权结构中控制权配置特征,设计多类型的控制变量,研究控制权对短期及长期并购绩效的影响。研究发现,公司控制权人性质、控制权程度、控制方式、权力均衡性等都会对并购绩效产生不同的影响。In companies with centralized ownership structure, the largest shareholder has majority control, which is significantly different with the decentralized ownership structure, where the managers has control right. So the effect of these two control mode on the merger performance is completely different, but there is little attention to the control effect in company with centralized ownership structure at home and abroad. Based on the acquisition samples of Chinese listed companies during 2004-2012, using rich variables to depict the characteristic of control rights allocation in companies with centralized ownership structure, and designing many types of control variables, this article analyzes the influence of control rights on M＆A performance in the short-term and long-term. The results show that the nature of controller, the extent of control, the mode of control, and the balance of power have significant effects on the M＆A performance.

关 键 词：集中式股权结构 控制权 控制权配置 并购 并购绩效 

分 类 号：F270.5[经济管理—企业管理]