城市再生水BOT项目的最优拍卖机制设计  

On Mechanism Design of Auction in Urban Reused Water BOT Project

作　　者：严培胜[1] 

机构地区：[1]湖北经济学院统计学院,湖北武汉430205

出　　处：《长江大学学报（自科版）（上旬）》2014年第7期1-4,共4页JOURNAL OF YANGTZE UNIVERSITY (NATURAL SCIENCE EDITION) SCI ＆ ENG

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71071119;71231007);国家哲学社会科学基金资助项目(12BGL027);湖北省教育厅资助项目(Q2012190314G289);湖北水事研究中心项目(2013B007)

摘　　要：基于政府部门对拍卖使用日益的增加,讨论了城市再生水BOT项目拍卖的机制设计问题。为了提高项目拍卖者对城市再生水BOT项目特许经营权的配置效率,从政府的角度设计了一套科学合理的特许经营权竞标机制。基于激励机制设计思想,建立了满足个体理性和激励相容性约束的拍卖机制模型,通过模型求解得到最优的竞标机制,并利用歧视价格拍卖实现了最优机制。实例分析表明,该机制既能诱导竞标企业说真话,真实地披露自己的成本类型信息,又能提高政府对城市再生水BOT项目的配置效率,为政府进行城市再生水BOT项目的拍卖提供了重要的理论工具,具有一定的理论意义和实际应用价值。Motivated by the increasing use of auctions by government agencies,the mechanism design of auction in urban reused water BOT project is considered.Auction is an effective means of resource allocation and mechanism of price revealed.In this paper,by using the mechanism design theory and auction theory,a feasible mechanism is explored to improve the allocation efficiency of franchise bidding.The auction model developed is based on the incentive mechanism design approach,it assures that the bidders satisfy the conditions of incentive-compatibility constraints and express their true preferences and efficiencies to maximize the utility of government expected social welfare.The optimal auction mechanism can be reached when the solution of the model is obtained.In the example,the mechanism can induce the bidding firms saying the truth,but also can improve the efficiency of the urban reused water BOT project.It provides an important theoretical tool for the auction of urban reused water BOT project,and has the certain theoretical significance and practical application value

关 键 词：城市再生水BOT项目 特许经营权 歧视价格拍卖 激励机制 

分 类 号：O224[理学—运筹学与控制论]