中央国有企业投资管控效率对股东回报的影响——基于国有企业股权多元化目标的研究  

The Influence of Management & Control Efficiency of Investment on the Shareholders' Payoff in the Central State-owned Companies——Based on the Perspective of Equities Diversification in the State-owned Companies

作　　者：刘建丽[1] 张文珂[2] 张芳芳[3] 

机构地区：[1]中国社会科学院工业经济研究所,北京100836 [2]中国社会科学院研究生院,北京102488 [3]东北财经大学会计学院,辽宁大连116025

出　　处：《中国工业经济》2014年第8期109-121,共13页China Industrial Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年项目"国有企业跨国投资与政府监管问题研究"(批准号12CGL007);安徽省优秀青年人才基金重点项目"净利润构成成分的波动性与现金分配"(批准号2012SQRW051ZD);安徽省优秀青年人才基金重点项目"基于资金链视角的房地产企业风险管理研究"(批准号2012SQRW047ZD)

摘　　要：本文基于中央国有上市公司2007—2012年的财务面板数据,首先从大股东控制的角度出发,运用数据包络分析方法构建了投资管控效率的评价指标,然后将该指标用于分析国有企业投资管控效率与股东回报之间的关系。投资管控效率指标是一个多维度的度量指标,其构建思路有别于通常投资效率分析的投资现金流灵敏度视角。该指标不仅全面考虑了产出效果诸如有形资产的扩张、投资现金流的增长和经营现金流的加速效果,也考虑了管理成本和股权资本的投入,尤其考虑了大股东的股权占用。通过进一步的面板数据分析发现,现阶段投资管控效率与国有企业股东回报之间存在一种反向背离关系。该背离机制具有特定的管理内涵:可以预见,在其他条件相同的情况下,当国有企业的投资管控效率较高时,企业的股东回报较低;当投资管控效率较低时,股东回报较高。理顺投资管控效率与股东回报之间的作用机制,有利于引导国有企业在提高管控效率的同时,进行合理的利益分配,从而更好地实现股权多元化改革目标和更高的投资效率。Based on the financial panel data of central state-owned listed companies from 2007 to 2012, the management ＆ control efficiency of investment index is constructed with data envelopment analysis in this paper from the angle of major stockholders, and then we analyze the relationship between management ＆ control efficiency of investment and shareholder＇s payoff in state-owned firms with the efficiency score. The management ＆ control efficiency of investment index is a multi-dimensions measure,differing from the angle of investment-cash flow sensitivity in usually investment efficiency analysis. Not only the output effects such as the expansion of physical assets, the raise of investment cash flow and the accelerate effects of operation cash flow, but also the input such as management cost and the capital equity,especially the occupied equity of big holders are considered in the index. After further panel data analysis, this paper finds that there exists a distortion relationship between management ＆ control efficiency of investment and shareholders＇ payoff which is deviated from the investors＇ interest. The deviate mechanism of reversal effect has specific implications： It can predict that the shareholders＇ payoff is lower when the management ＆ control efficiency of investment is higher in the state-owned firms. Assuming other conditions are the same, shareholders＇ payoff tends to be higher only when the management ＆ control efficiency of investment is lower. It is needed to rationalize the effecting mechanism between the management ＆ control efficiency of investment and shareholders＇ payoff for the state-owned companies＇ reform goal of diversified equity can be favorably realized.

关 键 词：中央国有企业 投资管控效率 大股东控制 股东回报 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]