批发价格契约下考虑公平关切的供应链协调及契约设计  

Effects of Fairness Concerns on Supply Chain Coordination and Contract Design

作　　者：牛占文[1] 郁艳青 何龙飞[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津大学管理与经济学部,天津300072

出　　处：《工业工程》2014年第4期63-69,共7页Industrial Engineering Journal

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71071107)

摘　　要：本文将公平关切分为利己性和利他性两因子,在不同因子水平下研究了批发价格契约下供应链的协调及旁支付契约设计。发现虽然供应链仍不能协调,但是当零售商追求利他性的同时会促进利己性的实现,使零售商的最优决策更加接近系统最优;当零售商追求利己性时会达到损人不利己的效果使零售商的最优决策偏离系统最优,并添加算例进行了验证。同时,还发现公平关切因子与旁支付函数系数无关。Incorporating fairness concerns into supply chain management is an important research direction to behavior operation management. Fairness concerns are divided into altruism preference and egoism preference, and the impact of different fairness concerns on supply chain coordination of wholesale price contract and side-payment self-enforcing contract is studied. And it shows that although supply chain cannot coordinate when the retailer seeks altruism, it will help its egoism and make its optimal decision much closer to the system; when the retailer seeks egoism, it will do harm to both its altruism and egoism, getting its optimal decision further away from the system. A numerical example is given to verify the effectiveness of the conclusion. What＇ s more, it also shows that fairness concerns are not related to the coefficients of the side-payment function.

关 键 词：批发价格契约 供应链协调 公平关切 旁支付设计 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]