北京市大学生村官激励机制构建研究  

Study of incentive mechanism of graduate“Village Officials”in Beijing

作　　者：常海斌[1] 周海川[2] 

机构地区：[1]北京联合大学 [2]中国林业科学研究院林业科技信息研究所

出　　处：《世界农业》2014年第9期170-174,177,共6页World Agriculture

基　　金：国家社科重大课题"开放经济条件下完善我国农产品价格形成机制和调控机制研究--基于产业链联动优化的视角"(编号:09&ZD044)

摘　　要：针对北京市大学生村官激励机制中存在的政策过分集中于上下游环节,选拔、任用方式缺乏有效性、培养和使用不匹配、管理不全面和出口机制不完善等问题,建立了一个自上而下,辐射上、中、下游环节的大学生村官激励机制"塔式"优化模型。提出要全面统筹大学生村官培养链的上、中、下游,在优化和完善经济、政治、能力提升、发展4项激励内容的基础上,重点加强选拔、帮扶、报酬、培训、考核、奖惩、晋升、出口8大制度建设。There are some issues in the incentive mechanism of graduate'village officials'in Beijing,the policy concentrates on the downstream part,selection and appointment is lack of effectiveness,training and does not match use,management is not comprehensive and export mechanism is inadequate.This paper established a Student Village Incentives'tower'optimization model,which is a top-down,including the upper,middle and lower reaches of the three links.We should proposed comprehensive train chain of graduate'village officials',optimize and improve the four incentives,such as the economic,political,ability and development,strengthen eight institutional such as selection,assistance,compensation,training,appraisal,rewards and punishments,promotion,export.

关 键 词：大学生村官 激励机制 “塔式”模型 优化 

分 类 号：D422.6[政治法律—政治学]