高管团队管理能力与IPO抑价关系的博弈分析  

作　　者：方强[1] 

机构地区：[1]广州科技贸易职业学院

出　　处：《企业经济》2014年第9期54-57,共4页Enterprise Economy

摘　　要：本文假定发行人比投资者拥有更多有关企业价值的信息,并在分析高管团队管理能力充当企业价值信号的理论依据基础上,建立高管团队管理能力与IPO抑价关系的信号传递博弈模型,分析结果表明:高管团队管理能力对企业价值具有认证效应,管理能力强的高管团队可以更好地向外部投资者传递企业的真实价值信息,减少企业在股票市场上的信息不对称,从而降低IPO抑价。In this paper, we assume that the issuer has more information of the firm value than the investor. Based on analyzing the theory evidence that the top management team（TMT）＇ s management ability acts as a signal of firm value, we build a signaling game model of the relationship between TMT＇ s management ability and IPO underprieing. The result shows that TMT＇ s management ability has a certification effect on firm value. TMT with higher management ability can do better on transmitting real information of value so that the information asymmetry of the firm on the stock market can be reduced, and the IPO underpricing can be decreased.

关 键 词：高管团队 管理能力 IPO抑价 信号传递博弈模型 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学]