质量影响需求的OEM供应链投资成本分担博弈研究  

Study on Investment Cost Sharing Game in OEM Supply Chain Considering Quality Influence Demands

作　　者：姜金德[1,2] 李帮义[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京航空航天大学经济与管理学院,江苏南京211106 [2]中材装备集团有限公司南京分公司,江苏南京211100

出　　处：《科技管理研究》2014年第18期192-197,共6页Science and Technology Management Research

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目"发展循环经济与中国特色的再制造产业协调发展研究"(10BGL010);教育部高校博士点基金项目"生产者责任延伸系统的运作机制研究"(20113218110024)

摘　　要：在一个质量影响需求的贴牌生产供应链系统中给出品牌商、制造商在集中决策和分散决策下的最优策略,分析在投资成本分担情形下随着投资成本分担比例的增加,制造商的利润是单调递增的、品牌商和供应链总利润先增大后减小,得出使贴牌生产供应链总利润最大的分担比例取值,进一步给出各方实现收益Pareto改进的分担比例的取值区间。最后通过算例验证文中的结论。Based on an OEM supply chain system in which quality influences demands, the paper offers the optimal strate-gy of brand company and manufacturer under the centralized and decentralized decision - making. In the situation of the in-vestment cost sharing, with the investment cost sharing ratio increasing, manufacturers profit is monotonically increasing,and the profits of brand company and the total supply chain first increase and then decrease. The paper obtains the sharingratio value which makes OEM supply chain total profits nlaximum, further gives sharing ratio value interval in which theparties can achieve Pareto improvement revenue. Finally, an example verifies the conclusions of the paper.

关 键 词：专有技术 贴牌生产 质量水平 成本分担 

分 类 号：F273.2[经济管理—企业管理] F224[经济管理—国民经济]