外生单向溢出效应下纵向差异化产品Cournot和Bertrand竞争均衡的比较研究  

One Way Spillovers Effect in a Vertical Differentiation Market Under the Cournot and Bertrand Duopoly

作　　者：白让让[1] 李会[1] 

机构地区：[1]复旦大学管理学院,上海200433

出　　处：《科技和产业》2014年第10期1-6,共6页Science Technology and Industry

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(71372114);教育部人文社会科学项目(12YJA630003)

摘　　要：研究价格(Bertrand)和数量(Cournot)竞争模式下,单向溢出对企业质量选择、利润的影响。以纵向差异化市场结构为例,建立了基于单向质量溢出的不对称寡头竞争模型,运用赋值计算对模型的均衡解进行了比较分析,结论是:1给定溢出因子和学习效应的合理取值范围,领先和跟随企业的质量与利润在价格竞争下都小于数量竞争;2质量间的单向溢出效应、跟随者的学习努力都会导致领先者初始质量的下降,但在价格竞争时,这种"逆向选择"效应的程度较低;3跟随者的学习激励随着溢出效应的提高而降低,并不受竞争策略变化的影响。这些发现可以解释中国轿车产业竞争模式对合资和自主创新企业关系变化的影响。This paper compares the firm＇s quality choice and profit under the Bertrand and Cournot competition market with one-way spillovers effects. An asymmetric duopoly is proposed in a vertical differentiated product market. Simulations shows that the leader and follower firm＇s quality and profits are always higher under Cournot quantity competition than under Bertrand price competition gave the rational content value of the spillover element and learning effect. Even with the one-way quality spillovers effect and follower＇s learning incentive increasing, the leader＇s quality will reduce, but those kind of inverse effects are usually lower in the Bertrand competition. The follower＇s learning efforts will decrease with the spillover effect increasing. Those finds can interpret the relationship changes between the native firms＇ innovation and the joint-venture compa- ny ＇ aualitv choice.

关 键 词：单向溢出 博弈模型 纵向差异化 数值模拟 

分 类 号：F273[经济管理—企业管理]