企业腐败动机与“最优”腐败程度实证研究  

The Motivation of Firm Corruption and the “Optimal” Corruption Level

作　　者：徐雷[1] 王乐[1] 

机构地区：[1]渤海大学管理学院,辽宁锦州121013

出　　处：《商业经济与管理》2014年第9期34-41,共8页Journal of Business Economics

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学基金青年项目"企业双能力;经营绩效与国民财富--企业在应对市场与应对政府间的权衡选择"(13YJC790167);辽宁省社会科学基金青年项目"新生代民营企业家队伍建设研究"(L13CGL022)

摘　　要：对于企业向官员行贿动机的解释主要有两种相反的观点,一是企业为了获取政府帮助而主动行贿,二是企业在威胁逼迫条件下的被动行贿。文章从企业在应对政府和应对市场两项事务间的权衡出发,构建企业绩效与腐败强度间的二项式回归模型,通过与传统线性回归模型的比较,发现企业腐败是一种主动行为,腐败的目的是为了构建政治关系以获取相应回报。运用世界银行企业调查数据,二次项回归模型显示出绩效与腐败强度间显著的倒U型曲线关系,文章得出了企业的"最优"腐败程度并对其政策含义进行了解释。Because of the linear hypothesis, existing literature shows disagreement on the relationship between corruption andbusiness performance. Some scholars argue that businesses bribe the government actively; others point out its passiveness. The con-flict between the two empirical views shows the different academic understandings of firm corruption. This paper studies the relation-ship between corruption and business performance based on the Weigh options between the business dealing with the government anddealing with the market, and builds a quadratic regression model to investigate the ＂optimal＂ degree of dealing with the government.The World Bank＇s enterprise survey data confirms the reverse U relationship between the business and corruption. The paper thengoes on to explain the ＂optimal＂ corruption level and its policy implication.

关 键 词：腐败 应对政府 企业绩效 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]