本科生导师制激励问题研究  

Incentive Problem of Tutorial System for Undergraduate

作　　者：王鑫[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆工商大学融智学院,重庆400033

出　　处：《重庆理工大学学报（社会科学）》2014年第8期137-142,共6页Journal of Chongqing University of Technology（Social Science）

基　　金：重庆市教委高等教育教学改革研究项目"面向职业能力培养的经济学实验教学体系研究"(103224)

摘　　要：运用博弈论的分析方法解释本科生导师制在推行过程中遇到的激励问题。通过构建一个非对称信息的静态模型,发现导师指导学生的努力程度将取决于学校的惩罚力度、考核成本以及该制度给学校带来的收益,而学校对教师指导情况的考核概率则主要受到其制定的奖惩规则和教师科研水平的影响。This paper uses the game theory method to explain the incentive problems encountered in the process of carrying out tutorial system for undergraduates.By constructing an asymmetric informa-tion static model,we find that the efforts tutors make into guiding students depend on the school’s punishment,assessment cost and the benefit brought in by the system for the university.While the as-sessment probability of school teachers guidance state is mainly influenced by its rewards and punish-ment rules and the teachers’scientific research level.

关 键 词：本科生导师制 激励问题 非对称信息博弈 

分 类 号：G64[文化科学—高等教育学]