基于委托代理理论的工程监理期望值模型  

An Expected Value Model of the Engineering Supervision Based on Principal-agent Theory

作　　者：李涛[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]长沙理工大学交通运输工程学院,湖南长沙410004 [2]浙江通衢交通建设监理咨询有限公司,浙江衢州324000

出　　处：《模糊系统与数学》2014年第4期186-190,共5页Fuzzy Systems and Mathematics

摘　　要：针对工程项目建设中委托人与代理人具有不对称信息,提出了一种基于模糊随机约束规划的工程监理主体行为激励引导的优化模型;由于代理人(工程监理)存在着私人信息,因此将保留效用假设为一个三角模糊变量,针对委托人在信息不对称的情况下,可能对代理人的实际努力程度估计出现误差,用随机变量描述代理人的努力程度,在多任务委托代理模型的基础上,结合工程监理特点,建立了基于模糊随机约束规划且符合工程监理工作实际的数学模型,并结合某工程项目实例进行运算,验证了构建的工程监理激励引导优化模型是正确的。Aiming at asymmetry information contained in principal and agent in the project construction, the paper proposes an optimization model guided and inspired by the subject behavior of engineering supervision, this model is based on fuzzy random constrained programming. Because of the agent ~s （engineering supervision） private information, it keeps utility hypothesis as a triangular fuzzy variable. Aiming at principal＇s （owner） situation of information asymmetry, the agent＇s actual level of effort may be estimated inaccurately by the principal, the paper uses random variables to describe the agent＇s level of effort. Based on the multitask principal-agent model and combined with the characteristics of engineering construction supervision, it builds mathematical model, which is based on fuzzy random constrained programming and conforms to the fact of engineering supervision work, and takes a construction project as an example to calculate, finally it proved that the best incentive model of engineering supervision proposed is right.

关 键 词：工程监理 模糊随机约束 期望值模型 

分 类 号：O221[理学—运筹学与控制论]