制度环境与机构投资者治理--基于真实盈余管理的视角  

Institutional Environment and Institutional Investors' Governance from the Prospect of Real Earnings Management

作　　者：缪毅[1] 管悦[2] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200052 [2]建设银行上海市分行,上海200120

出　　处：《证券市场导报》2014年第10期18-23,共6页Securities Market Herald

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(项目编号：70772061)

摘　　要：近年来,随着监管力度的不断增强,越来越多的上市公司更倾向于利用真实活动而不是传统的应计项目来进行盈余管理。现有的文献多考虑机构投资者对应计项目盈余管理的治理作用,本文则从真实活动盈余管理方面对当前的研究进行了补充。我们发现,压力抵制性的机构投资者能够抑制上市公司的真实盈余管理行为,但压力敏感性的机构投资者并不能做到这一点,我们的研究还显示,制度环境影响着机构治理作用的发挥,因此进一步完善制度环境,对资本市场的健康发展至关重要。In recent years, a growing number of listed companies use real activity rather than the traditional accruals for earnings management. Existing literatures mostly consider the governance effect of institutional investors on accrual based earnings management, this paper supplements them in the real activity aspect. We find that the pressure-resisted institutional investors are capable to suppress real activity based earnings management, but the pressure-sensitive institutional investors can＇t do it. Further research shows that environment will affect the governance role, so that it＇s important to improve the environment for the healthy development of the capital market.

关 键 词：制度环境 机构投资者 真实盈余管理 治理效应 

分 类 号：F830.9[经济管理—金融学]