风险企业家报酬契约模型研究——基于监督机制和激励机制的分析  

Study on the Reward Contract Model forEntrepreneur:——Based on Monitoring and Incentive Mechanism

作　　者：李云飞[1] 

机构地区：[1]西华师范大学数学与信息学院,四川南充637009

出　　处：《西华师范大学学报（自然科学版）》2014年第3期286-291,共6页Journal of China West Normal University(Natural Sciences)

基　　金：四川省教育厅自然科学重点项目(13ZA0016);西华师范大学博士科研启动基金(12B025)

摘　　要：结合风险企业家的努力水平以及风险投资家的增值服务和监督工作,构建了风险企业家报酬契约模型,并分析了监督机制和激励机制对风险投资参与者行为策略及代理成本的影响.理论研究结果表明,在监督机制和激励机制的作用下,风险企业家的投机行为将会受到有效约束,从而降低其道德风险发生的可能性.对于风险投资家而言,契约中的监督机制和激励机制在一定程度上具有相互替代性.By combining the effort of the entrepreneur and the value-added services and the monitoring of the venture capitalist,a reward contract model for the entrepreneur is set up. The influence of the monitoring and incentive mechanism on the behavior of the venture capital participants and the agency cost is discussed. The theoretical researches show that the speculation of the entrepreneur will be effectively constrained under the influence of the monitoring and incentive mechanism. From the aspect of the venture capitalist,the monitoring and incentive mechanism is alternative.

关 键 词：风险投资 契约 监督机制 激励机制 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]