盈余管理和审计师行业专长  

Earnings Management and Auditor Specialization

作　　者：王帆[1] 武恒光[2] 

机构地区：[1]浙江工商大学财务与会计学院,浙江杭州310018 [2]山东财经大学会计学院,山东济南250014

出　　处：《广东财经大学学报》2014年第5期78-88,共11页Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics

基　　金：教育部人文社科青年基金资助项目(13YJC790139);浙江省自然科学基金项目(LQ14G020003);浙江省社科联研究课题(2014N103);山东省教育厅课题(J13WF06)

摘　　要：以2001年-2012年的A股上市银行为研究样本,检验审计师行业专长对贷款损失准备的影响,结果发现：税收和贷款损失准备前利润与贷款损失准备呈显著正相关关系,表明我国银行业存在利润平滑现象;行业专长与税收和贷款损失准备前利润的交乘项与贷款损失准备呈显著负相关关系,表明审计师行业专长减少了银行管理层的利润平滑。进一步研究发现,审计师行业专长有效约束了收益增加型盈余管理与收益减少型盈余管理。使用倾向得分匹配法控制自选择问题以及减少样本规模检验样本量影响问题,得到的实证结果均与上述结论一致,表明行业专长对银行管理层会计政策选择的自由裁量权进行了有效监督。Taking the 2001 -2012 A-share listed banks as the sample, this paper examines the impact of auditor industry expertise on the provision for loan loss. It finds that the profit before tax and loan loss provision is significantly positively correlated to the loan loss provision, indicating the presence of Chinese banking industry＇s smooth earnings. In addition, the product of industry expertise and the profit before loan loss provision are significantly negatively correlated to the loan loss provision, indicating that auditor industry ex- pertise reduces the bank management＇s smooth earnings. The further study finds that auditor industry expert- ise effectively constrains both income-increasing earnings management and income-decreasing earnings management. The use of propensity score matched method to control the self-selection bias and the reduction of the amount of samples to test their effect verify the conclusion above. Thus, the results indicate that industry expertise has an effective supervision on the bank management＇s discretion on accounting policy choices.

关 键 词：审计师 行业专长 盈余管理 贷款损失准备 倾向得分匹配法 商业银行 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学] F830.42F239.22