机构地区:[1]南京信息工程大学气象灾害预报预警与评估协同创新中心/经济管理学院,江苏南京210044 [2]南京信息工程大学中国制造业发展研究院,江苏南京210044
出 处:《中国人口·资源与环境》2014年第9期37-44,共8页China Population,Resources and Environment
基 金:国家自然科学基金项目"减少砍伐和退化造成的排放机制(REDD+)影响毁林行为的传导路径及权利平等性研究"(编号:71303123);国家自然科学基金项目:"中国温室气体减排技术发展战略研究"(编号:U0970165);国家社科基金项目:"我国新能源设备制造业补贴的适度规模及模式选择研究"(编号:13CGL094);教育部人文社科基金项目"全球森林减排背景下中国REDD+影响毁林行为减缓的传导路径及政策评估方法研究"(编号:13YJCZH148);教育部人文社科基金青年项目"居民家庭节能投资中‘市场失灵’的形成机理与应对政策研究"(编号:13YJC790225);江苏高校优势学科建设工程
摘 要:本文通过建立一个简单支付模型研究了完全信息和不完全信息情景下经济目标、环境目标以及福利目标对于REDD+机制收益分配的影响。按照政策制定者知道的代理人机会成本的信息,本文设定了完全信息和不完全信息两种情景。政策制定者在两种情景中对于总毁林和潜在造林面积的分布、代理人总收益以及各代理人的毁林或潜在造林面积都拥有完全信息。为了研究不同的政策目标对REDD+机制效果的影响,本文设定三种政策目标:经济目标、环境目标以及福利目标。在此基础上,利用云南生态固碳造林项目的入户调查数据,对三种政策目标的效果进行了仿真研究。通过仿真研究分析了在完全信息和不完全信息条件下三种政策目标对于代理人受益、政策制定者收益以及减少毁林或增加造林总面积的影响。研究结果表明,在不完全信息情景下,政策制定者只能按照相同的补偿标准支付给所有代理人,因而三种政策目标的产出完全相同。对于经济目标的政策制定者而言,完全信息并不会带来森林面积的增加,但会导致REDD+剩余从代理人转移至政策制定者。相反,对于环境目标政策制定者而言,完全信息会导致森林面积增加而减少代理人的收益。对于福利目标政策制定者,完全信息并不会导致总体福利有所差别,且收益仍归代理人所有,而减少毁林或增加造林的面积大于等于不完全信息。The impacts of economic object, environmental object and poverty alleviation object on benefit distribution for REDD + are analyzed by a simple payment model in two scenarios: asymmetric and full information for opportunity cost. According to agents' opportunity costs the policy makers known, the scenarios of asymmetric and full information are established. The policy makers have full intormation about total distribution of deforestation and potential afforestation area, agents' benefits, amount of agents' deforestation or potential afforestation in both scenarios. In order to study the impacts of different policy objects on REDD + results, economic object, environmental object and poverty alleviation object are set up in the paper. On this basis, the household survey data of ecological reforestation and carbon sequestration project in Yunnan is used to simulate the effects of three policy objectives. According to the simulation study, the impacts of three policy objects on agents' benefits, benefits of policy makers and the avoided deforestation or increased 'afforestation are analyzed. The results show that policy nmkers can only pay same compensation to all agents in the scenario of asymmetric information. Therefore, the outputs of three policy objects are the same. Full information may not increase the torest area for the policy makers of economic object, but could lead to a redistribution of REDD + surplus from agents to policy maker. By contrast, full information increases the forest area and reduces the agents' benefits for the policy makers of environmental object. Full infurmation makes no difference to overall welfare for the policy makers of poverty alleviation object, and the benefits remain belong the agents. The avoided deforestation or increased afforestation in the scenario of full information will be more than that in the scenario of asymmetric information.
关 键 词:REDD+机制 完全信息 不完全信息 收益分配 政策目标
分 类 号:X196[环境科学与工程—环境科学]
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