发展生态产业链的激励机制研究  

Research on Incentive Mechanism of Developing Ecological Industry

作　　者：何杨平[1,2] 姚若辉[2] 

机构地区：[1]中山大学岭南学院,广东广州510275 [2]华南师范大学经济与管理学院,广东广州510006

出　　处：《华南师范大学学报（社会科学版）》2014年第4期108-112,182,共5页Journal of South China Normal University：Social Science Edition

基　　金：广东省哲学社会科学"十二五"规划项目"大宗战略性资源贸易定阶权博弈与供应链协调机制设计"(GD11YGL14)

摘　　要：针对企业自身发展生态产业链的动力不足,构建了政府引导上游企业改造副产品的激励模型。通过对仅存在道德风险下和逆向选择与道德风险共存下的激励模型的分析,得出结论:仅考虑道德风险的激励合同,无法防止改造困难类型企业模仿改造容易类型企业而获得额外收益,从而降低了改造容易类型企业发展生态产业链的积极性;而考虑逆向选择和道德风险共存的激励合同,虽然使改造困难类型企业的激励因子和努力水平向下扭曲了,但避免了改造困难类型企业模仿改造容易类型企业的动机,保障了两类企业的利益。In view of the insufficient motivation of the enterprises in developing ecological industry chain,this paper constructs the incentive models for government to promote the upstream enterprises to transform by-products. By the analysis of the incentive models under moral hazard and under the coexistence of adverse selection and moral hazard,we draw the following conclusions: when the incentive contracts only consider moral hazard,it is unable to prevent low-ability type enterprise from imitating high-ability type enterprise,and achieving additional revenue. This reduces the enthusiasm of the high-ability type enterprises in developing ecological industry chain. When incentive contracts consider the adverse selection and moral risk,although incentive factor and the effort level of high-ability type enterprise is downward distorted,it avoids low-ability type to imitate high-ability type enterprise,and protects the interests of the two types of enterprises.

关 键 词：生态产业链 道德风险 逆向选择 激励机制 

分 类 号：F062.2[经济管理—政治经济学]