供应商与制造商在订单分配方面的博弈行为  

Game Behavior on Order Allocation between Manufacturer and Suppliers

作　　者：徐辉[1] 侯建明[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海理工大学管理学院,上海200093

出　　处：《物流工程与管理》2014年第9期125-127,共3页Logistics Engineering and Management

摘　　要：对于两类不同质供应商与单制造商组成的供应链在订单分配方面的博弈行为,通过综合考虑部件价格、质量、交货期等构造订单质量指标,建立制造商和两类供应商的斯塔克尔伯格效用模型。模型显示,当两类供应商送交的订单质量相等时,制造商的效用可以达到最大;同时两类供应商对订单数量的需求均受到竞争对手对订单偏好的影响,由此可能导致供应商出现虚报自身信息的情况。制造商引入惩罚机制,并通过对惩罚进行适当限制,可实现让供应商实报私人信息的目标。Game behavior on order allocation are analyzed on the supply chain with two different suppliers and one manufacturer .Order quality is constructed by considering the price , quality and delivery of components .Stackelberg models on utility of manufacturer and two types of suppliers are established .Based on the analysis of the models ,manufacturer can achieve maximum utility when order quality of two suppliers equal .Meanwhile ,the demand of order quantities for two types of suppliers are affected by the preference of competitors on order quantities ,which may lead to suppliers to conceal their private information . Manufacturer can choose appropriate restrictions on the punishment after the mechanism of punishment is introduced , then manufacturer can achieve the goal which suppliers to reveal their private information.

关 键 词：订单分配 供应链 斯塔克尔伯格模型 博弈论 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]