政治联系规模、过度投资与董事会治理效应研究  

Study on Political Connections,Over-investment and Governance Effect of the Board of Directors

作　　者：赵岩[1] 

机构地区：[1]福建江夏学院会计学院,福建福州350108

出　　处：《湖南财政经济学院学报》2014年第6期18-26,共9页Journal of Hunan University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：教育部人文社科基金项目"社会资本视角下的企业投融资行为研究"(项目编号:12YJA630012);福建省自然科学基金项目"企业社会资本度量;演化及其对投融资影响研究"(项目编号:2011J01382)

摘　　要：以寻租为研究视角,探讨政治联系对民营企业过度投资的影响,剖析董事会治理对政治联系下过度投资的抑制效应,实证结果显示:政治联系下的过度投资行为是民营企业与地方政府基于资源相互依赖下的资源交换行为和利益相互输送行为,政治联系规模对过度投资产生了正向影响;政治联系将民营企业与地方政府的利益捆绑到一起,政治联系成为公司治理的重要因素,削弱了公司治理的独立性和有效性,董事会固有的决策和监督职能难以约束政治联系下的过度投资行为。This paper takes rent -seeking as the perspective of the study, investigates how political connections influences over - investment of private enterprises, and analyzes how board of directors inhibits over - investment under political connec- tions. The results show that over - investment under political connections is the resources exchanging behavior and the interest mutually transferring behavior between private enterprises and local governments, the scale of political connec- tions positively influence over- investment, political connections the interests of private enterprises and the interests of local governments, political connections becomes an important factor of corporate governance, it weakens the independ- ence and effectiveness of corporate governance, the natural decision - making and supervision function of board of direc- tors are difficult to restrain over - investment under political connections.

关 键 词：政治联系 过度投资 董事会治理 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理] F275[经济管理—国民经济]