信息不对称下节能服务外包合同的设计  

Design of Contract in Energy Service Contracting under Asymmetric Information

作　　者：彭鸿广[1] 骆建文[2] 

机构地区：[1]浙江科技学院经济管理学院,浙江杭州310023 [2]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200052

出　　处：《预测》2014年第6期60-65,共6页Forecasting

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学基金青年资助项目(09YJC630208);浙江省哲学社会科学规划资助项目(08ZXSJ039YB);浙江科技学院科研启动基金资助项目

摘　　要：本文考虑一个风险中性的节能服务公司和一个风险规避的用能企业在节能成本上具有不对称信息,采用一个能源费用节约额的线性函数作为用能单位向节能服务公司的支付,建立了一个斯坦伯格博弈模型来研究节能服务外包合同的设计。研究发现最优合同是效益保证和效益共享两种形式的结合,即节能服务公司向用能单位支付一个保证的节约额,然后双方共同对最后实现的能源费用节约额进行分享,且保证节约额和节能服务公司的分享比例随节能服务公司的效率、节能绩效的不确定性和用能单位风险规避程度的增加而增加。Information asymmetry on energy saving cost between a risk-neutral energy service company and a risk-averse client is taken into account. A linear function of the total realized energy savings is employed as the payment from the client to the company, and a Stackelberg game model is developed to design the optimal contract in energy service contracting. The research shows that the optimal contract integrates both guaranteed savings and shared savings, which means that the energy service company pays a guaranteed savings to the client and then the realized savings is shared by both parties. Moreover, both the guaranteed savings and the sharing proportion of the company from the total realized energy savings increase as the efficiency of the company, the uncertainty of the energy service performance and the degree of risk aversion of the client increase.

关 键 词：节能服务外包 最优合约 效益保证 效益共享 斯坦伯格博弈 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]