合作生产视角下的服务外包契约设计  

Contract Design for Service Outsourcing under Joint Production Perspective

作　　者：张宗明[1] 杜荣[1] 廖貅武[2] 

机构地区：[1]西安电子科技大学经济与管理学院,西安710071 [2]西安交通大学管理学院,西安710049

出　　处：《管理科学》2014年第6期77-89,共13页Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71271164)~~

摘　　要：考虑一个客户企业与一个服务商共同努力实现服务外包项目价值的缔约问题,服务参与双方努力程度的无法验证和服务商可能拥有私有成本信息会降低服务绩效,导致服务外包失败。针对双方努力程度无法验证和服务商拥有私有信息这两类风险因素,建立甄别服务商私有信息的委托代理模型,分析非对称信息下的最优契约,刻画了合作生产性质服务外包环境特点对两类风险因素带来的不利效应的影响。研究结果表明,在服务商成本信息对称情形下,激励共享仅受合作双方的相对重要性的影响;而在服务商成本信息不对称情形下,低成本类型服务商的激励共享不变,高成本类型服务商的激励共享还与两种类型服务商的分布和成本差异相关。服务商的重要性越高,服务商私有信息带来的损失越高;服务商与客户企业的重要性相差不大时,努力程度不可验证带来的损失较高。This article analyzes the contracting issues arising in service outsourcing where the service output depends on the joint effort of a client and a vendor, and unverifiablity of their effort and vendor＇s private cost information will result in poor perform- ance and failure of the outsourcing. To address these two risk factors, i.e. , unverifiablity of effort and vendor＇s private informa- tion, we propose a principal-agent model to reveal the private information of the vendor, and then we analyze the optimal contract under asymmetric information, at last we investigate the service environment characteristics＇ impact on the adverse effects of the two risk factors. The results indicate that under symmetric cost information the incentive share only depends on the relative impor- tance of the collaborative parties. However, when the vendor has private cost information, the incentive share of low cost vendor remains the same as that under symmetric information, but the incentive share of high cost vendor is affected by the distribution and cost ratio of the two type vendors. The adverse effect of vendor＇s private cost information is higher when the vender plays a more important role, and the adverse effect of unverifiablity of effort is higher when the client is almost equally as important as the vendor.

关 键 词：合作生产 服务外包 契约设计 私有信息 委托代理模型 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]