基于演化博弈的证券交易者策略选择研究  

A Research on Securities Dealers' Strategy Choices Based on Evolution Game

作　　者：徐妍[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京工业大学经济与管理学院,江苏南京210009

出　　处：《南京理工大学学报（社会科学版）》2014年第6期13-21,共9页Journal of Nanjing University of Science and Technology：Social Sciences

摘　　要：在分析我国证券市场实际发展状况和回顾目前国内外相关理论研究的基础上,基于博弈学习与演进的理论思想,构建了证券市场交易者动态演化模型,并在不同标准下分析了证券交易者交易行为的动态演化过程。结果表明:在整个证券市场交易者学习与博弈演化过程中,博弈双方的效用函数、交易群体的财富水平、证券市场的风格、系统种群的初始状态、理性交易成本、证券市场固有的系统风险等因素,影响着其路径的演化方式及演化方向。同时,各个因素变量的变化也会影响着系统种群演化的路径选择和最终的均衡状态。This paper constructs a dynamic evolution model of stock market investors,and analyzes the dynamic evolution process of security investors＇ trade behavior under different standards,all being based on an analysis of the actual security market development,a review of the relevant theoretical researches home and abroad,and the learning and evolution of game theory principles. Results indicate that,throughout security investors＇ learning and game evolution,both the evolution path and direction are influenced by many factors,such as the utility function of two game sides,the wealth level of trading groups,the style of security markets,the initial state of system population,the rational trading costs,the inherent systematic risk of security market,and so on. At the same time,these factors＇ variable changes will also affect the system population＇s evolution path selection and the final equilibrium state.

关 键 词：噪声交易 理性交易 策略选择 博弈学习与演化 动态均衡 

分 类 号：F832.48[经济管理—金融学]