独立董事制度对关联交易质量影响机制研究  

The Affecting Mechanisms Research of Independent Director System in Related Transactions

作　　者：孔春丽[1] 张天龙[1] 张同建[2] 

机构地区：[1]云南大学经济学院,云南昆明6500911 [2]江苏大学管理学院,江苏镇江212013

出　　处：《郧阳师范高等专科学校学报》2014年第5期71-74,共4页Journal of Yunyang Teachers College

基　　金：国家社会科学基金(项目编号:12BG1025)

摘　　要：关联交易是集团公司内部交易的一种方式,但为大股东掏空提供了便利,成为控股股东侵害中小股东利益的工具。独立董事制度的目标是保护中小股东的利益,实质上是对关联交易行使监督权。基于我国上市公司的样本数据,借助于多元回归分析方法,实证性的研究发现:独立董事独立性、专业技能水平、职业生涯年限对关联交易质量存在着积极的作用,而独立董事声誉资本和独立董事人数对关联交易没有产生有效的促进作用,从而为我国独立董事制度的完善提供了可靠的理论借鉴。The related transactions is a way of inner transaction of group company,but provides a convenient for largest shareholder to make company empty,and become a tool for controlling shareholder to encroach on small shareholder in interests.The goal of the independent director system is to protect the interests of minority shareholders,essentially to supervise the related transactions.Based on the sample data of listed companies and by means of multiple regression analysis,empirical research findings：the independence of the independent directors,professional skill level,career life have a positive effect in related transactions,while the reputation capital of independent directors and independent directors number have no effect in related transaction,which provide a reliable theory reference to optimize the Independent Director System in China.

关 键 词：关联交易 独立董事 内部人控制 大股东掏空 多元回归分析 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]