基于NASH协商的促销努力成本分担机制  

A Research on the Mechanism of Sharing Sales Effort Cost Based on Nash Negotiation

作　　者：马小勇[1] 陈良华[1] 

机构地区：[1]东南大学经济管理学院,江苏南京211189

出　　处：《工业工程》2014年第5期114-117,123,共5页Industrial Engineering Journal

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71272111);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助(3214003901)

摘　　要：传统的回购契约、数量折扣契约和利润共享契约等可以解决销售商订购量与实际需求不匹配问题,但会产生新的激励约束而失效。合作促销契约的引入,并与其他协调机制的结合可以有效改善供应链协调的最优化水平。以成本分担为对象,采用不对称Nash协商模型,来设计伴随销售商促销努力的供应链协调契约,弥补了剩余收益数据难以获得与忽略谈判能力因素造成最优报酬契约设计的缺陷。The traditional buy-back contract , quantity discount contract and profit sharing contract can solve the problem of mismatch between vendors ordering quantity and the actual demand , but they produce new incentive failure .Introduction of the cooperation promotion , combined with other coordination mecha-nism , can effectively improve the level of optimization of supply chain coordination .With the cost sharing as the object , adopting the asymmetric Nash negotiation model with retailer promotional effort , a supply chain coordination contract is designed , thus making up the residual income data which are difficult to ob-tain and ignore the negotiation ability factors causing defects in optimal reward contract design .

关 键 词：促销努力成本 供应链协调 分担比例 Nash协商 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]